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Globalization and 
Africa’s Unfinished Agenda
Thandika Mkandawire
There are two ways of losing oneself: by a walled segregation into the
particular or by dilution in the “universal”—Aimé Cesaire
The title of my essay alludes to the disjunction between Africa’s
own “social projects” and the exigencies of globalization, which is due
partly to internal problems in Africa itself and partly to the imposed
and more or less spontaneous articulation of Africa to the global com-
munity. If for other nations it is plausible that globalization is driven
by the invisible hand of market forces or by deliberate policy choices at
the national level, for African nations it is driven largely by the very
visible feet of international financial institutions (IFIs). This does not
mean, however, that the forces driving globalization are irrelevant to
Africa or that Africans have been passively inserted into the global
order. “Signalling” these global forces to look toward Africa is a cen-
tral aspect of current policy-making. Indeed, the whole point of struc-
tural adjustment programs presumably is to relink to these processes
and enable the continent to reap the benefits of global competition for
markets and investment. On the domestic side, there are always corre-
lates and anchors to the globalization process. Globalization in Africa
has been abetted by national actors who have generally adopted a
supine position toward policies imposed on them.
My belief is that how Africa “goes global” will be determined not
only by the exogenous and putatively ineluctable forces of globaliza-
tion, but also by the degree of social cohesion that countries can indi-
vidually and collectively muster. It is this social cohesion that will
determine and strengthen the internal strategies necessary to make
politically viable and legitimate whatever external strategies the coun-
tries choose. Failure to summon adequate internal responses to the
external challenges will expose African countries to the process of
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“immiserizing” globalization.1 Both internal institutional and political
weaknesses and the particular way Africa is being integrated into the
global system are likely to produce this undesirable outcome. The
internal problems are the result, on the one hand, of internal inconsis-
tencies and conflicts and what Africans themselves generally describe
as “betrayal” by the leaders of the promise of independence and, on
the other, of the reverberations of foreign pressures on domestic poli-
tics, which may not only alter the preferences or ideologies of key
actors, but also influence the social composition and strength of politi-
cal coalitions.
Globalization has generally proceeded either by completely ignor-
ing or by banalizing localized concerns, histories, problems, and the
“social pacts” designed to address them. Indeed, globalization
processes and the ideological paraphernalia that go with them have
given the impression that these concerns were provincial, dated, and
idiosyncratic. In contrast, I have deliberately chosen to judge globaliza-
tion through the prism of African nationalism. The point here is not to
hark back to some golden era of nationalist élan, ideological coherence,
and a “promising beginning.” Indeed, I believe its “promise” still
holds some of the elements for the construction of social cohesion for
Africa’s fruitful interaction with the rest of the world. In Africa, as else-
where, nationalism will be one of the ideologies that affects responses
to globalization. I am aware of the contested meanings of nationalist
ideologies in Africa and the existence of both sub- and supranationalist
ideologies. My own reading of the situation is that the ideologies
espoused by the African nationalist movements remain the most dom-
inant. I intend, therefore, to reflect on globalization and Africa against
the backdrop of the promises and commitments made at the start of
the postcolonial period.
There is considerable confusion about what constitutes globaliza-
tion — about its origins, distinctness, geographical extent, intensity,
impact, driving force, direction (is it unidirectional or reversible?), and
future. Anthony McGrew has usefully identified three clusters of inter-
pretations of globalization: the hyper-globalists, the sceptics and the
transformationalists.2 For the hyper-globalists, depending on one’s ide-
ological predisposition, globalization represents a new epoch in
human history, full of either great promise or dire consequences — a
“world war,” in the words of Robinson. In most such analyses, the pre-
sumption is that there is a zero-sum relationship between globalization
and nation-states. Globalization, then, is interpreted as leading to a
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“hollowing” of the state, to denationalization in which “national gov-
ernments are relegated to little more than transmission belts for global
capitalism or, alternatively, catalysts for nurturing mechanisms of gov-
ernance at the local, regional and global levels more compatible with
the logic of the global marketplace.” Conversely, the strengthening of
the nation-state is treated as a “spanner in the wheels.” The sceptics
doubt that the existing empirical evidence (in terms of global flows of
trade, investments, and labor) casts doubt on the newness of the con-
temporary levels of economic dependence.3 They also doubt that the
power of governments, or state sovereignty, has been eroded to the
extent suggested by the hyper-globalists. Indeed, some of these would
go further and argue that globalization is a project of nation-states or
that it is at least mediated by domestic state actors. Finally, there are
the transformationalists, who somehow lie in between, rejecting both
the hyper-globalists’ rhetoric of the end of the state and the sceptics’
insistence that nothing much has changed.4
Remarkably, most participants in this debate — both the supporters
and detractors of globalization—have succumbed to the crudest forms
of materialism in which the economy-technology “base” determines
the “superstructure” of culture, politics, and global governance. How-
ever, despite the immense fetishization, globalization is ultimately the
result of human agency. The nature of the global order that is sup-
posed to emerge is not predetermined by some ineluctable force but
will, instead, result from the combination of human ingenuity, ideolo-
gies, caprice, solidarity, greed, and so on, on the one hand, and
resource endowments on the other. However, since different classes,
societies, and nations are differently endowed in terms of economic,
technological, and military resources, the imprint that countries leave
on global affairs and processes varies accordingly. So, too, does the
incidence of costs and gains of these processes at the national level. At
the global level, what may make these processes appear beyond our
control is the absence of political structures, social norms, and institu-
tional arrangements requisite to global governance.5 Even here, how-
ever, one ought to take a more nuanced approach. If anarchy seems to
be the guiding principle of globalization for large groups of humanity,
certain actors in the globalization drama have established fairly elabo-
rate mechanisms for managing things close to their hearts or, more
accurately, to their pockets. So the issue is not so much lack of global
governance but the asymmetric extent of such governance as it exists
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today and which is evolving in terms of the authority, reach, account-
ability, and inclusiveness of its agenda.
In much of the writing about globalization and Africa, most of the
nuances in the debate disappear; as a result, the dominant view
emphasizes the hyper-globalists on one hand and the incomprehensi-
ble marginalization of the continent on the other. As Helleiner states,
the question usually asked with respect to Africa is: “Why isn’t there
more of it?” Africa’s marginalization appears as the exception that
proves the rule. Globalization is figuratively portrayed as an unstop-
pable train that African nations fail to board at their peril. No time is
allowed to make special arrangements before one’s departure. The
boarding process is so disorderly that only the strong and quick are
able to get on. It imposes itself without individual or social will, facili-
tated by such exogenous factors as technology and a shadowy zeit-
geist. Threatening language is used to caution those who, for some
reason, may not be ready for the “trip.” Thus, Africans are reminded
that they are at a crossroads. Either Africa takes the “appropriate mea-
sures” (read IMF/World Bank policies) or it will continue to be mar-
ginalized into oblivion. In the famous words of Margaret Thatcher:
“There is no alternative” to adjustment to the exigencies of globaliza-
tion.
While the years 1960–75 were marked by significant gains in several
social indicators, including per capita incomes, the last two decades,
during which globalization has apparently gained its distinctive char-
acteristics, have been labelled “the lost decades” for Africa. Economies
stagnated, social conflicts erupted into bloody wars, and famines were
rampant, producing harrowing images that seared television screens
around the world. Economically, Africa was being marginalized as its
share in global trade and investment plummeted.6 Much of this mar-
ginalization has been measured in trade figures, share in world GDP,
and share in private-sector investment flows. The story these numbers
tell is that Africa’s share in all these has generally declined over the last
fifty years. This forced delinking of the economy is not exactly what
those who called for self-reliance and delinking meant. So inconse-
quential has Africa apparently become that an article on globalization
in the British weekly, the Economist a few years ago, observed sardon-
ically that no one would notice if Africa were to be wiped off the face
of the earth. The writer’s point was that the marginalization of Africa
had gone so far on its own that the continent had ceased to matter, if it
ever did, and so it would not be missed if it somehow disappeared.7
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Significantly, little was said about how Africans would react to their
imminent departure from the globe. Regardless of the cynicism that
typically informs the publication on matters relating to Africa, the
Economist does, in some sense, reflect perceptions about how Africa is
— or isn’t — becoming globalized. For those whose vision has been
shaped by the all-too-frequent images of incomprehensible human suf-
fering and degradation that Africa has copiously supplied to the
media, the thought that Africa might somehow vanish can only be
appealing. But Africa will not go away. Given its geographical immen-
sity, its disappearance would literally have earthshaking conse-
quences. However, Africa’s links are not only geographic, they include
too many bonds to recount here. And that, I suppose, explains why I
am here — not a specimen of an endangered species, but as someone
presumed to have something to say about an important part of our
humanity.
We should also bear in mind that globalization is not always con-
cerned with crossing borders, as most measures of trade shares sug-
gest, but with the “relocation of national public governance functions
to transnational private arenas and with the development inside
national states — through legislative acts, court rulings, executive
orders — of the mechanisms necessary to accommodate the rights of
global capital in what are still national territories under the exclusive
control of states,” as Sassen states. However slight the impact of Africa
on global affairs may be, the processes of globalization have enormous
implications for African societies beyond the purely economic.
II. The Uncompleted Tasks: The Nationalist Commitments
From the many self-allotted “historical tasks” of African nationalism, I
believe five stand out as the most widely accepted at the time. These
were: complete decolonization of the continent, nation-building, economic
and social development, democratization, and regional cooperation. These
were the basic elements of the “nation-state project” of African nation-
alism, a much-abused and now badly tarnished ideology that I will,
nevertheless, use as a prism through which to view processes of glob-
alization and the promise they hold for Africa’s accomplishment of its
“historical tasks.” Of the five, only the first one—decolonization—has
been completed, now that South Africa has at last won its arduous bat-
tle for noncolonial status.
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National Sovereignty and Nation-Building
Several factors have prevented Africa from completing the vital task of
nation-building. One of these has been the gross mismanagement of
the nation-building project due to internal struggles and politics; fur-
thermore, much of the scaffolding for nation-building has been weak-
ened in the process of adjusting to what is purveyed by the Bretton
Woods institutions (BWIs) as the exigencies of the global system. For
some of the hyper-globalists, this may not only be welcome but also
prudent in light of the inevitability of the erosion of the nation-state.
Africans have lingering doubts about the accuracy of pronouncements,
made immediately following the independence of their nations, on the
demise of the nation-state.
The internal factors undermining nation-building constitute the
“original sin” of African nationalism. For understandable reasons,
African nationalism became a totalizing ideology to combat real and
imagined divisive forces such as the divide-and-rule strategies of the
erstwhile colonial masters and the “tribalism” of some of the leaders.
Confronted with the social pluralism of their countries, the nationalists
had two theoretical options. They could either ride roughshod over
social pluralism and produce political uniformity, or they could design
structures that produced a political pluralism congruent with that of
the social pluralism of their societies. Most chose the former option.
This choice, combined with the centralization of power that it entailed,
has meant that issues that could easily be resolved at the local level
have acquired a menacing national significance because decision-mak-
ing processes have been overtaxed. It has also meant that there are no
local-level governmental institutions to absorb some of the blows
inflicted by globalization.
Because the African elites tended to equate nation-building with
state-building, the latter has completely overshadowed the former.
The authoritarian nature of state-building and the neoliberal “stato-
phobia” have combined to suggest that state-building should be aban-
doned or drastically curtailed. Regardless of this attitude, the state
will, for better or for worse, continue to be a major force for much of
mankind. Although states can and do foment internal conflict, often by
omission rather than commission, they remain the single most impor-
tant mediating institution. Thus, the forced incapacitation of states is
dangerously premature. The failure of states to perform their functions
almost invariably leads to bloody conflicts as anomic violence and gen-
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eral lawlessness assume ethnic dimensions. Witness how the collapse
of the state has affected numerous African countries.
In addition, the ruling elites frequently have failed to pursue the
task of nation-building seriously and consistently. This can be attrib-
uted partly to the end of “elite consensus,” which has produced wide-
spread conflicts that have engulfed whole nations and caused
enormous suffering. This was part cause and part effect of the political
and institutional failure to deal creatively with the pluralistic nature of
our societies. It is crucial to remember that their colonial experience
has colored African leaders’ understanding of the nation-state. None
of the major colonial powers in Africa was either multi-ethnic or fed-
eral in character. And late attempts by departing colonial powers to
cobble together federal arrangements in their former colonies ulti-
mately failed. In the postcolonial era, little thought was given to the
notion of the nation-state and its relationship with contiguous states
with which it may have been vying for or sharing identities and popu-
lations.
Furthermore, demographic changes that have occurred during the
last thirty years have made the rhetoric of nationalism less convincing.
Because 70 percent of the African population was born after indepen-
dence, “national unity” has been taken for granted. In addition, the
economic crisis and the gross mismanagement of national resources
have further eroded the legitimization of the “national project.” And
the authoritarian nature of nationalist politics, which has alienated sig-
nificant segments of society, has also compromised the legitimacy of
the ruling elite by undermining their effectiveness as a rallying point
for Africa’s young population. The uninhibited interference by for-
eigners in national affairs not only complicates national politics but
also tends to trivialize it by severely attenuating national choices and
relegating national institutions to a secondary role.
In the midst of this beleaguered nationalism, the pressures of glob-
alization were applied, further undermining the cohesive force of
nationalism. In the immediate aftermath of colonialism, African coun-
tries confronted the reality of neocolonialist opposition, which was
most articulately formulated by Kwame Nkrumah. This development
made Africa the perfect breeding ground for nationalist theories about
dependence. In the 1970s, with the dramatic rise of OPEC (Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries) and the distinct possibility of
establishing cartels for other primary commodities, prospects for the
Third World looked bright. The terms “self-reliance,” “delinking,” and
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a “New International Economic Order” suggested the very real possi-
bility of deepening political independence by extending it to the eco-
nomic sphere. Faced with the prospect of a hold on natural resources
by cartels in the Third World, the developed countries began appeal-
ing for nonconfrontational interdependence. However, recession and
restructuring in these countries and the indebtedness of many leading
developing countries negated the need for interdependence. Devel-
oped countries shifted from the rhetoric of interdependence, with its
intimations of cooperation and global solidarity, to globalization that
emphasized competition. Once again, many developing countries
found themselves in the grip of BWIs.
Nationalism, already entangled in its own contradictions, had to
defer to the demands of external powers. In terms of economic poli-
cies, nationalism regards the nation as its unit of analysis; it prefers
some form of control over economic activities, either through national-
ization or through “indigenization,” and it tends to engage in redis-
tributive policies to hold the nation together. Panterritorial pricing and
regional allocation of economic activities were essentially redistribu-
tive policies aimed at cementing the nation together. Some of these
policies ultimately contributed to the fiscal crisis that made these
nationalist objectives untenable. The corruption and mismanagement
of these policies relegated them to the realm of rent-seeking and patron
clientelism, which presumably accounted for Africa’s decline.
Although these policies have usually been judged in purely economic
terms, there are political objectives underlying them. In a sense, they
were “political investments,” and failure to make such investments
robbed the development process of the “political capital” essential to
sustain it.
Globalization, too, has become entangled in its own contradictions.
Although its key actors demand political stability, its methods are
extremely disruptive of social cohesion. One effect of postcolonial
development has been increased social differentiation along class or
income lines. The current crisis and the patterns of adjustment adopted
to address it have exacerbated the pressures of inequality, especially
with the indiscriminate rejection of the redistributive elements of
nationalist policies mentioned above. This has increased the potential
for ethnic conflict by intensifying intra-ethnic differentiation. The para-
doxical consequence of such intra-ethnic differentiation is that a pre-
mium is placed on ethnic cohesion (as elites opportunistically harp on
their ethnic ties with the poor). During the crisis years, we have seen
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devastating ethnic conflicts in Africa. With one ideology that has so far
provided some modicum of political stability severely eroded, claims
of subnationalism have surfaced. And hanging as the sword of Damo-
cles over the processes of both nation-building and globalization is eth-
nic conflict, real or imagined.
The current situation has also spawned new leaders with a jaun-
diced view of nationalism. Associating nationalism with the corrupt
regimes they have replaced, these individuals tend to embrace global-
ization uncritically and have been much less concerned with legiti-
macy at home. Indeed, the crises of the 1980s and 1990s have made
“dependence” so normal and seemingly acceptable (“pragmatic” is the
word often used) that it has ceased to require theoretical explication or
to evoke convincing political dissent.8 The “success stories” proudly
parade their dependence on foreign tutelage and do not object to being
called “good pupils” by foreign masters.9 Thus, denationalization
applies not only to institutions but also to individuals and ideologies.
Some, like the governors of central banks, proudly flaunt their mem-
bership in external “epistemic communities” of global financial net-
works. Others, empowered by these global networks, acquire greater
political leverage at the national level. Those who see globalization as a
panacea for our ills bemoan the exclusion of this group from power.
Thus, Holman of the Financial Times writes:
Well-educated, articulate young Africans, unburdened by colonial com-
plexes and at ease with the concepts of free trade, capitalism and global-
ization, are being kept from the instruments of power.10
Leaders such as Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Paul Kagame of
Rwanda, Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea, and Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia are
among the breed of new leaders. However, judging from the behavior
and character of some of these men, the promise is not as bright as the
Financial Times suggests. So far, they have assumed power through
military means, have been unable to establish inclusive national coali-
tions at home, have had little time for democracy, and are partial to
guns. With their eyes fixed on the external prize, they tend to be less
sensitive to domestic politics. And at the time of this writing, they are
all involved in some war or other, contributing to a political instability
that is unlikely to create propitious conditions for globalization.11
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Economic Development
During the struggle for independence, the objective of eradicating the
“unholy trinity” of poverty, ignorance, and disease was a salient fea-
ture of nationalist political platforms. And the material correlates of
the nation-building project were economic development and the ideol-
ogy of “developmentalism,” which inevitably assumed a national
character. A central element of that quest for development was indus-
trialization. In terms of globalization in the postwar period, Africa’s
position continued to be that of exporter of raw materials. The inconse-
quential inflow of capital into the manufacturing sector compelled
African states, regardless of their ideology, to engage in direct produc-
tive economic activities. Contrary to myth, “African socialism”
involved little nationalization for the simple reason that there was not
much to nationalize.
African leaders realized that, although the development endeavour
was a national effort, the context would be international. There were,
of course, considerable differences as to what the class character of the
national project and the state-capital nexus underpinning it would be.
Vaguely, it was to involve some import substitution, some indigeniza-
tion, and arduous pursuit of foreign capital through “industrialization
by invitation.” In devising their development strategies, Africans
relied heavily on exports and history. They also were constantly con-
fronted with idealized histories of how other ruling classes had devel-
oped by pursuing nationalist policies in the context of rapid
internationalization of economies. In the 1960s, the idealized process of
nation-building was that of Europe, whose “stages of growth” devel-
oping countries were supposed to retrace. European development was
portrayed as being led by a “national bourgeoisie,” which had
replaced the feudal classes. In sharp contrast, Africa was saddled with
“dependent,” “petty bourgeois,” “incomplete” national bourgeoisies
who managed “overdeveloped,” “peripheral,” “dependent,” “neo-
colonial,” “client” states. If “dependence” was a condition afflicting all
key actors, it was difficult to see how Africa would escape that bind
and participate meaningfully in the global economy. One consequence
was a discourse in which pessimism about the prospects for change
within the existing system was tempered by extremely voluntaristic
calls for delinking or revolution. The inevitable process of social differ-
entiation was punctuated with calls for a new international order.
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By the 1980s, the ideal shifted. No longer did Europe and America
provide the models to emulate and the paths to trace; now, the high-
performance East Asian economies, with their “developmental states,”
were the new standards. Such states were characterized by an ideolog-
ical commitment to development, a political capacity to articulate and
impose a national project of development, and an efficient and honest
bureaucracy, or technical elite, insulated from avaricious interest
groups. Their situations sharply contrasted with the African state,
which was captured by interest groups or was wallowing in debilitat-
ing patrimonial relationships that rendered it incapable of pursuing
the national agenda of development.
The developmentalist project has not been without its detractors,
critics, and of course, victims. The first criticism is that development
has, on the one hand, been elevated to an ideology that has sanctioned
destruction of cultures and violation of human rights by national gov-
ernments; on the other, it has been used by foreign powers or donors
as a license for intervening in the affairs of other nations. It has also
been used as a camouflage for corruption, xenophobia, and the
destruction of the environment.12 To the extent that these charges are,
in many ways, valid, they ought to be addressed by those of us who
still advocate development.
The orthodox criticism is that developmentalism in its African vari-
ant was statist and favored strategies that emphasized independence
and self-sufficiency, presumably producing the present impasse in
African countries. Ideally, globalization leads to freer trade and a free
flow of productive inputs, including capital and labor. Expanding
economies open up to the world in order to extend their market oppor-
tunities and to benefit from the purchase of goods from other, better-
placed producers. Just as rational individuals presumably engage in
the market so they can benefit from the economies of specialization
facilitated by a division of labor, nations enter into trade relations to
benefit from an internal division of labor.
African policy-makers are accused of failing to heed the lessons of
trade theory and of exhibiting an anti-trade bias. These accusations
arise because initial industrialization in the African countries was
focused on import substitution as opposed to the export orientation
presumably pursued by more successful economies. They also involve
a considerable distortion of the history of economic policies of devel-
oping countries and a biased reading of the “success stories.” For one
thing, the dichotomy of “export-oriented versus import substitution”
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is misleading because even the most successful exporters continue to
pursue import substitution. For another, import substitution was not a
strategy for autarky but for the eventual diversification of the export
base away from primary products toward industrial products. Finally,
and more significantly, Africa’s marginalization is not the result of an
anti-trade bias. Dani Rodrik argues persuasively that:
Africa’s marginalization in world trade is primarily due to the conti-
nent’s lagging performance in terms of output growth. It is not due to
trade ratios (relative to GDP) that are low by cross-national standards.
African countries trade on average as much as would be expected by
international standards once their individual characteristics (such as
income level and size) are taken into account. It is because they have
failed to expand their economies at sufficient rates that their importance
in world trade has shrunk.13
III. Maladjusting Africa and Shifting Goals
Until 1973, many African countries enjoyed positive rates of growth. In
fact, the differences in performance between Asia and Africa were not
that remarkable. Then came the oil crisis and the subsequent decline in
terms of trade. Initially, many countries considered the crisis tempo-
rary and could, therefore, be financed by borrowing; with negative
interest caused by the need to recycle petrodollars, it did seem prudent
to pursue this course. This was also the advice of the BWIs, which
accused African countries of being too cautious and of underborrow-
ing. In some cases, BWIs and private financial syndicates actively
encouraged such countries as Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Malawi, and Nige-
ria to avail themselves of the financial markets.
The way borrowed funds were used compounded Africa’s prob-
lems. Some were put in long-term productive investments, the viabil-
ity of which depended upon the continuation of the good times.
However, huge sums of money were wasted on the construction of air-
ports, palaces, and new government buildings and the purchase of
arms. Blame for this profligacy lies with the avarice, desire for self-
aggrandizement, and megalomania of African leaders as well as the
urging by lenders awash with excess liquidity desperate for outlets. By
the end of the 1970s and definitely following the 1982 Mexican finan-
cial crisis, such borrowing was clearly unsustainable, and African
countries found themselves frozen out of the private financial markets
—an exclusion that persists today.
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Initially, African countries were compelled to seek aid in the form of
balance-of-payments support. To obtain it, they have had to accept a
cascade of conditionalities — all intended to make state policies “mar-
ket friendly.” African countries entered a phase of policy tutelage that
is unparalleled in terms of how involved foreign governments are in
the affairs of sovereign states, in terms of the arrogance of those
administering the nostrums, and in terms of the non-accountability of
those who repeatedly were proven wrong in both diagnosis and pre-
scription. Much of the advice and tutelage has involved experimenting
with a package of policies for which there was no prior experience. The
result has been the construction of a policy edifice by an ad hoc accre-
tion of the “necessary conditions;” the end result is an unwieldy and
ultimately self-defeating accumulation of conditionalities.
The learning curve has been extremely steep, partly because of lack
of transparency of the experimentation and teaching processes and
partly because success stories have been rare and ephemeral — and
failures have been discreetly buried to avoid an embarrassing autopsy.
Over the years, many African countries have, at one time or another,
been touted as success stories or pupils only to inexplicably disappear
from the honors list. The lack of transparency resides in the fact that
the “letters of intent,” spelling out what agreements have been
reached, by what means, and to what ends, are confidential. I should
add here that Africans have remained highly sceptical of the appropri-
ateness of the measures proposed and of the knowledge of the peri-
patetic consultants who scour the continent in search of new projects.
We must remember that those who assumed the driver’s seat in our
affairs were often blind or blindfolded; there was little correlation
between what they said were fundamentals and the actual perfor-
mance of economies, and where there was correlation, the outcomes
did not necessarily match the predicted results.
Getting Prices Right
In the early phases of adjustment, African governments were advised
to “get the prices right” through liberalization and greater reliance on
markets. The assumption was that a minimalist state was the best
instrument for development. This was a radical shift from the role
originally assigned to the state. The problem of development had
always been to find institutional arrangements and political incentives
that would enable and induce states to competently and efficiently
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compensate for market failures. Neoliberals have tended to downplay
market failures and then to accept them, arguing that “government
failures” would be worse. This advice ignored vast amounts of devel-
opment research that pointed to the main structural constraints on the
functioning of markets in the developing countries. The constraints
included lack of capacity to adopt imported technologies, economies of
scale, information asymmetries, and absence of markets for a whole
range of goods and services. All these would affect the supply
responses to price incentives.
Although the fastest growing economies in the world were charac-
terized by strong interventionism and by what is now known as the
“developmental state,” Africa was counselled to favor a “minimalist
state” that largely confined itself to “night watchman” functions. For
years, the World Bank insisted on interpreting the Asian experience as
evidence of the virtues of neoliberalism. But when the Japanese gov-
ernment insisted the World Bank revisit the Asian experience, it even-
tually produced the Asian Miracle study, which acknowledged, for the
first time, the central role of the state, albeit with all kinds of caveats.
This admission did not, however, affect the World Bank’s advice to
Africans. The institution continued to argue that the Asian economies
could have performed even better without state intervention. It also
claimed that African governments were congenitally unable to do any-
thing useful about “market failures;” because while Asian states
enjoyed “autonomy” that allowed them to pursue national policies
without the encumbrance of societal demands, African states were too
prone to “capture” by rent seekers. Finally, following the Uruguay
Round Agreement, the new trade regime no longer permitted the pro-
tective measures that Asians pursued during their phase of rapid
industrialization. And so, in a 1994 report, the World Bank repeated
even more forcefully what it had stated in 1981 in the Berg Report.
Thus, retrenchment of the putatively “bloated bureaucracies” con-
tinued to be the order of the day. Much of this downsizing has not
been accompanied by a simultaneous introduction of performance-
enhancing measures and increased worker commitment. Instead, it
has further demoralized the civil service, which in some cases has
retaliated not only by not working, but also by stripping assets from
their places of employment. The fiscal capacity of the state has been
reduced by removing sources of revenue in order to stimulate private
investment. As Aron noted, “The state in Africa has come full circle to
small government of pre-colonial days; but with additional hysteresis
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effect from past shocks of a seriously depleted current institutional
capability, deterioration of the current quality and scope of social ser-
vices and infrastructure provision, coupled with a fiscal position
highly vulnerable to changes in foreign aid.”14 The “hollowing” of the
state does not augur well for the consolidation of democracy in Africa.
Indeed, for most countries, the current structure of global governance
undermines local governance, creating spaces for criminalization of
significant aspects of social life and allowing for delinquency by indi-
vidual states in the management of national affairs. In the developing
countries, this manifests itself in the replacement of “developmental”
states by “regulatory” or “competitive” ones.15 In the quest for external
legitimacy to attract foreign capital, these entities tend to ignore or
even suppress domestic “social pacts” and allow external experts pre-
sumed to be attractive to foreign interests to assume control of key pol-
icy instruments.
Getting Governance Right
After years of attempting, by experimentation, to rein in the state, it
now seems to have dawned on the BWIs that capitalist accumulation
demands a strong state.16 Saskia Sassen reminds us that many of the
things that we categorize as global are contingent on national states as
administrative capacities and sources of legitimacy. Where state struc-
tures have been enfeebled by downsizing and by the ravages of a
demoralized civil service, they are unlikely to facilitate globalization
even in the structural adjustment form it takes in Africa. By the end of
the 1980s, “good governance” was added to the policy agenda. At the
time, good governance did not refer to democratization, but to essen-
tially technocratic notions of accountability and transparency.17 It also
became a precondition for Africa’s participation in globalization. In the
words of Alassene Quattara:
The second main reason why governance issues are crucial for Africa at
this point in its history is because, I believe, the continent is at a cross-
roads — cross-roads being swept by the winds of globalisation. If Africa
takes the correct turn, towards better governance, it can take full advan-
tage of globalisation. If, instead, African countries take the wrong turn,
ignoring the forces of globalisation and neglecting to improve gover-
nance through institutional and structural reform, not only will their
progress be slowed, but the very path they are following could be eradi-
cated.18
Thandika Mkandawire
85
The call for good governance is also driven by something that
assumes the appearance of a moral rearmament of an otherwise
demoralized state. However, since the impetus for such “remoraliza-
tion” is in the hands of external actors, it has failed to be anchored in
popular participation and to produce the kind of élan that only a truly
national project can arouse. There is a now a flurry of programs for
rehabilitating badly damaged state structures and for “capacity build-
ing.” It should be emphasized, however, that the central tenet of these
policies is to replace “developmental states” with essentially regula-
tory ones to ensure private investors of law and order and a docile
labor force. Such regulatory states fall far short of the institutional
capabilities that Africa needs to address its many developmental and
nation-building problems.
Getting Property Structures Right
In its 1995 report, the World Bank claimed that bureaucrats were still
too evident in the economy. Greater emphasis was then directed
toward privatization. As a result, the process of privatization was
accelerated. First, such privatization was supposed to improve the fis-
cal basis of the state by both providing fiscal revenue and unburdening
the state of subsidy-hungry industries. Second, it was supposed to
increase efficiency on the dubious grounds that privately owned firms
are more efficient than public ones. Third, it was supposed to signal to
foreign investors policy changes in individual countries. On the rev-
enue side, such privatization has not been of much use. Most of the
sales have been of the “fire sale” variety, promoted on the basis of
donor conditionality. And the tendency to “fatten the calf” before sell-
ing it has also absorbed much of the revenue. The efficiency attributed
to privatization is actually gains from competition. In most cases, one
incentive to private buyers is continued monopolization in a context of
inadequate regulatory instruments. As a result, the efficiency gains
from privatization remain elusive. Privatization may have attracted
foreign capital to buy up some of the activities, but little has gone into
new ones. Finally, the current types of privatization may not be politi-
cally sustainable because they often lead to a redistribution of wealth,
which either exacerbates ethnic conflict or merely “denationalizes”
property without contributing to the emergence of a social class that
politically supports privatization.
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Getting Politics Right
Initially, good governance essentially meant getting market-friendly
institutions right. Now, this has been extended to mean “getting poli-
tics right.” Due partly to the internal struggles for democracy, partly to
pressures from bilateral donors, and partly to pressures from non-
governmental organizations (especially those concerned with human
rights), BWIs have now also embraced democratization, albeit with
trepidation.19 “Good policies” now meant democracy. I should add
here that the persuasive and self-deceptive Western triumphalism,
which suggested that free markets and democracy were one and the
same thing, also played a role. Curiously, several studies suddenly
appeared to suggest that economic growth and democracy actually go
hand in hand or, at least, involve no obvious trade-offs. Despite the
fact that, for years, the two were treated as essentially opposed —
democracy being assumed to be a luxury that nations could only enjoy
at high levels of growth. Before reaching that destination, nations
would have to traverse the vale of tears in which strong governments
would ride roughshod over the myopic demands of the masses for
instant gratification.
Getting Culture Right
More recently, it has been suggested that what was wrong with Africa
was not only states or markets but also societies themselves rendered
impervious to any rational, collective pursuit of the national good.
African economies, once accused of wallowing in affective economic
relations and dense (and debilitating) social networks suddenly found
themselves lacking “social capital,” much of which consisted of pre-
cisely those characteristics of which African culture had only recently
had an excess.
The World Bank now has programs to enhance, mobilize, or create
such social capital. NGOs have repositioned themselves and now
claim not only to be involved in capacity building but also to be con-
tributing to social capital. Judging by past experience, the social engi-
neering presupposed by this new task should be cause for concern to
those interested in cultural change in Africa.
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Getting Policy Ownership Right
Over the years, African elites have been portrayed to other interna-
tional elites as incapable of being trusted with their countries’ affairs.
For some, African elites had misused their sovereignty, and there were
poorly veiled or even open suggestions that some form of recoloniza-
tion may, after all, be necessary. Africa’s “historical tasks,” which I
mentioned earlier, were viewed as not only passé but also as the actual
source of Africa’s tribulations. The rhetoric of the time portrays
African elites as corrupt, incompetent, rent seeking, and so on. This
tactic was used to justify circumvention of institutions dominated by
these elites in favor of international elites in the form of NGOs or inter-
national bureaucracies. The rhetoric has produced a disempowering
discourse in which local elites are portrayed as hopelessly immersed in
nefarious practices and, therefore, desperately in need of external
“agents of restraint,” as Collier put it.
It has also produced aid-conditionality regimes vitiated by princi-
pal-agent problems.20 The principal wants to, or must, spend money in
these countries, but wants the countries to do certain things in return.
The recipients want the money, but would rather do something else
with it. And so recidivism has become a regular feature of the adjust-
ment process. In turn, African policy-makers believe that shunning
conditionalities is a way to avoid the full force of what they are con-
vinced are antidevelopment policies. Indeed, some argue that their
“recidivism” has sustained development in these countries by circum-
venting what are essentially deflationary stabilization policies.
Donors now realize that policies are best implemented when the aid
recipients “own” them. While such policies as devaluation can be
implemented by a handful of technocrats in the Central Bank or Trea-
sury, the changes demanded by structural adjustment programs
(SAPs) require negotiating with many actors. Not surprisingly, the
new buzz words are “transfer of ownership.” Unfortunately, much of
this transfer has remained rhetorical or has involved a legerdemain that
makes “business as usual” look different while remaining the same.
Donors’ representatives permanently based in key ministries continue
to prepare country position papers for the recipient nations, which
then proclaim them as their own. This charade is apparently the out-
come of “policy dialogues,” which usually involve as much intellectual
exchange as that between a ventriloquist and a dummy.
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IV. The Experience
Probably the key outcome of policy-making during the adjustment
period is that it has been emptied of developmental objectives because
the focus has been on stabilization and financial-sector concerns,
which neglect the “real” economy. The fundamental policies that have
been devised relate more to financial concerns than to development.
Even the issue of poverty has received little attention except, perhaps,
when it has seemed politically expedient to appear to do something to
mitigate the negative effects of adjustment. That adjustment has failed
as a prerequisite for development, let alone as a “strategy for acceler-
ated development,” is now widely accepted. Even the chief economist
of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, recommended, in 1998, the tran-
scendence of the Washington consensus in order to place development
back on the agenda.
These admissions from the top have yet to filter down because they
apparently do not affect the policy pronouncements for African con-
sumption. Many still insist that adjustment is working. And when it is
not working, the advocates are always able to find a reason why. The
reasoning goes that if a country is doing well, it is adjusting; if it does
not do well, it is not adjusting. Consequently, the continued poor per-
formance of African economies, after more than fifteen years under the
tutelage of international financial institutions, is squarely blamed on
noncompliance with conditionalities and recidivism. Good perfor-
mance has been rare, and when it does occur, BWIs rush to claim
paternity. Thus the deputy managing director of the International
Monetary Fund, Alassane Quattara, would say the following about the
good performance of 1994 – 95: “A key underlying contribution has
come from progress made in macroeconomic stabilization and the
introduction of sweeping structural reforms.”21 Most of these gains,
however, were one of a kind and could be attributed to various cir-
cumstances that have little to do with policies. Improvements in terms
of trade and favorable climates (as shown in fluctuations in agricul-
tural output) explain much more than SAPs. And the recent shifts in
terms of trade following the Asian financial crisis clearly demonstrate
the fragility of African economies and their continued vulnerability to
external factors. By 1997, the growth rates had begun to falter and are
likely to have fallen further with the Asian crisis.
Recalling that Africa’s share in the global economy is not due to
anti-trade bias but to rates of growth, there is the ominous fact that
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investment, a key and robust determinant of long-term growth
prospects, remains very low. From an average of 25.4 percent during
1975 – 84, it declined to 19.3 percent in 1995. Domestic savings also
declined during the adjustment years.
Advocates of globalization claim that participation in world mar-
kets will lead to a process of convergence and productivity in different
countries, as predicted by neoclassical trade and growth theory, and
that the policies of adjustment were the right medicine for Africa’s
marginalization. Markets have been liberalized, economies made more
open, and public enterprises privatized. And, undeniably, there has
been a sea change in the African policy landscape. So far, policies
explicitly designed to ensure that liberalization would promote greater
integration and increased economic growth have failed. As a result,
Mosley writes “Africa represents the most stark example of the phe-
nomenon of limited convergence: the tendency of poorer developing
countries to experience deteriorating relative income levels, in spite of
having access, in principle, to higher rates of return on capital and
higher possibilities for technological catch-up.”22 Structural adjustment
in Africa has, thus far, meant reversing some of the changes that
African governments sought. Meanwhile, countries are driven back to
the production patterns of the colonial era through “back-to-the-
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Table 1 Recent Economic Performance Indicators of Africa, 1993–97
Indicators 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
GDP growth—Africa 0 2 2.7 4 2.9
–oil-exporting countries –0.3 1.4 3.1 4.2 3.6
–non-oil-exporting countries 0.1 2.6 2.4 3.7 2.3
–least developed countries –4 –0.7 4 4.5 2.4
Sectoral growth
–agricultural output 0.9 3.9 1.5 5.2 1.7
–mining value-added –0.5 –0.5 –0.2 6.5 3.8
–manufacturing value-added –0.8 2.9 4.5 2.5 2.5
Export unit value –7 0.5 7.3 –0.9 – 2.1
Import unit value –5.6 1 8.7 –2.9 –1
Oil price (brent crude $/b) 16.8 23.9 20.5 22.1 20
Non-oil-commodity price 2.8 22.1 5.9 –6.3 7.6
Consumer prices 29.5 38.7 33.1 25.1 28.3
Terms-of-trade index (1990=100) –4.5 1.2 1.5 4.6 1
Africa’s share in world trade 2.4 2.4 2.2 2 1.9
Current account (US$ billions) –9.7 –11.9 –16.2 –9.6 – 9.4
Source: ECA secretariat
future” adjustments of African economies and through the process of
deindustrialization. Ghana is back as the “Gold Coast,” Zambia is des-
perately trying to cling to its “Copperbelt,” and so on.
Globalization in Africa has been associated with deindustrializa-
tion. African economies were the quintessential “late latecomers” to
the process of industrialization. I have argued elsewhere that African
economies have somehow been out of sync with developments in
other parts of the world. When most economies embarked on import
substitution industrialization, financed either by borrowing or debt
default, much of Africa was under colonial rule, which permitted nei-
ther protection of domestic markets nor the running of deficits. Later,
when a great deal of industrialization was financed through Eurodol-
lar loans, Africans were generally reluctant borrowers; eventually,
much of their borrowing was not for industrialization but to finance
balance-of-payments problems. The phase of import substitution in
Africa has been very short, although it is often wrongly equated in
both content and duration with that of Latin America. SAPs have
called for policies that have prematurely exposed African industries to
global competition and thus induced widespread deindustrialization.
Evidence that more successful cases have had some kind of “industrial
policy” has been dismissed on the grounds that African countries
lacked both the type of government and the political acumen to pre-
vent “capture” of these policies by rent seekers and patron-client net-
works. We have learned from studies on technological development
how countries run the risk of being locked in a permanent slow-
growth trajectory if they follow the dictates of static comparative
advantage. To avoid this, governments have introduced policies that
generate externalities for a wide range of other industries and thus
place the economy on a more growth-inducing engagement with the
rest of the world. The dismissal of deliberate, strategic industrial and
trade policies to shape Africa’s position in the global trading system
runs the distinct danger of leaving Africa on the low-productivity,
low-growth path.
Waiting for Foreign Capital
Perhaps the most persuasive promise made by BWIs was that by swal-
lowing their nostrums, countries would attract foreign capital. Indeed,
this more than anything was the most attractive part of adjustment. To
the surprise of the purveyors of these policies, the response of private
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capital to Africa’s diligent adoption of SAPs has, according to the
World Bank, “been disappointing.” However, the poor response of pri-
vate investors—both domestic and foreign—should not have come as
a surprise, given the contractions of domestic markets through defla-
tionary policies and increased competition from imported goods, the
collapse of public services and infrastructure, and the pervasive politi-
cal uncertainty engendered by policies that have undermined the
“social pacts” that hitherto provided some modicum of social cohe-
sion.
The BWIs seem unaware of the extent to which their activities are a
source of uncertainty among businessmen. Contrary to the IMF’s
claims that adhesion to its policies can signal credibility and attract for-
eign investment, the African experience has been that the IMF’s seal of
approval is not taken seriously by the business community — and this
was before the Asian crisis. This scepticism about the IMF’s approval is
understandable in light of the history of non-graduation by any
African country. Indeed, there is the distinct danger that, since
economies under IMF intensive care never seem to recover, the IMF
presence actually signals trouble. The minimal foreign investment
trickling in has gone mostly into mining activities (especially oil and
gold) and in only a few countries. What little that has gone into the
manufacturing industry has been driven not by plans to set up new
productive enterprises but to buy up existing plants that are being sold
under fire-sale privatization conditions.
In situations where the price system is imperfect, economic relations
are often governed by contracts and reputation. And Africa has a seri-
ous reputation problem. We continue to contend with the Tarzan
image, which has proved surprisingly indelible in the minds of many.
Some of the bad publicity is the responsibility of Africa’s enemies, the
incurable racists, but much of it must be blamed on us or our “friends.”
Our contribution to this image problem has taken two forms. One is
the capacity of our leaders to foment disasters that nourish the insa-
tiable hunger of the outside world for horror stories from the “Dark
Continent.” The second is the mendicant stance we almost invariably
assume at international conferences. Our friends reinforce this unfor-
tunate posture by incessantly harping on our misfortunes in order to
drum up aid for us. I suspect that it is this combination of our role as
apparent mendicants and the paternalism of our “friends” that forced
Africa out of global financial markets. African governments and
regional institutions, such as the Economic Commission for Africa
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(ECA), began declaring they could not pay their debts at a time when
their debt-service ratios were much lower than those of the heavily
indebted Asian and Latin American countries. The World Bank
deemed us ready for a transfusion even though we were not anemic.
Instead of promoting our very good record — no default — we high-
lighted minor weaknesses, presumably hoping this would lead to debt
write-offs. Our wailing and clamor may eventually pay off, but only
after we have portrayed ourselves in a not very favorable light — as
“the sick man of the world.” I should add here that the repressive
regimes in Africa cast a pall of censorship that further “darkened” the
continent.
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Table 2 Savings and Investment in Africa 1975–97: 
Periodical Average (as % of GDP)
Indicator 1975– 1985– 1990–
1984 1989 1997
Gross Domestic Savings (GDS)
Africa 24.5 19.9 16.2
North Africa 34.1 23 18.8
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 21.3 18.2 15.9
SSA excluding South Africa and Nigeria 15.3 13.4 11.1
Gross National Savings (GNS)
Africa 21.2 15.3 12.4
North Africa 31.1 19.1 15.7
SSA 17.9 13.3 11
SSA excluding South Africa and Nigeria 12.1 8.4 4.9
Resource Transfer (GDS–GNS) Abroad
Africa 3.3 4.6 3.8
North Africa 3 3.9 3.1
SSA 3.4 4.9 4.9
SSA excluding South Africa and Nigeria 3.2 5 6.2
Gross Domestic Investment (GDI)
Africa 25.4 21.6 19.3
North Africa 31.7 28.7 24.6
SSA 22.9 17.7 17.3
SSA excluding South Africa and Nigeria 19.9 17.3 16.9
Resource Balance
Africa –4.2 –6.3 – 6.9
North Africa –0.6 –9.6 8.9
SSA –5 –4.4 – 5.9
SSA excluding South Africa and Nigeria 7.8 4 5.9
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, May 1997
In order to drum up support or to combat “aid fatigue,” the self-
proclaimed friends of Africa have engaged in almost obscene harping
on the poverty of African people. The World Bank’s erudite listing of
Africa’s foibles, its ephemeral claims of success, and its growing loss of
credibility even among its conservative supporters meant that its
stamp of approval carried less weight than the Bank let on and cer-
tainly less than Africans were made to believe. Burdened with a nega-
tive image, Africa is unlikely to benefit from foreign savings for its
accumulation purposes. Economic theory and empirical evidence sup-
port these presuppositions. Africa’s image problem overshadows the
“pull factors” designed to attract foreign capital.
The upshot of all this is that Africa will be hard put to attract invest-
ments for activities other than speculative or “traditional” ones like
mining, where conventional wisdom has always suggested fabulous
wealth can be made. And sure enough, the new wave of investments
into Africa is in mining and fly-by-night forays into Africa’s stock
exchanges.
Aid, Debt, and Globalization
Africa is most conspicuously present in the “global village” as a recipi-
ent of aid that has increasingly taken humanitarian form and is chan-
nelled through NGOs, partly to circumvent the suspect local elites. The
way chosen to assist or force African countries to adopt a particular
form of adjustment has intensified Africa’s aid dependence to such an
extent that there are now references to African countries’ ”addiction”
to aid. In 1978, aid accounted for an average of 38 percent of central
governments’ expenditures, 48 percent of Gross Domestic Investment,
and 21 percent of imports of goods and services. By 1993, the figures
were 62 percent, 99 percent, and 38 percent, respectively. These are
obviously ultimately unsustainable levels of dependency. Signifi-
cantly, these ratios were declining in other developing countries,
which relied more on private capital rather than official flows. After
fifteen years of adjustment, African countries find themselves more
heavily indebted than ever. Between 1980 and 1992, sub-Saharan
Africa’s debt to international financial institutions increased by 43 bil-
lion dollars, and exports decreased by nearly 3 billion. One characteris-
tic feature of the SSA debt is that it is with official rather than private
institutions. Much has been said about debt relief but little has hap-
pened. Indeed, if there is anything distinctive about Africa’s position
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in the global system, it is the way its debt has been treated. John May-
nard Keynes noted that if one owed someone ten dollars, one was in
trouble, but if one owed someone a million dollars, then it was that
someone who was in trouble. Although the debt burden for individual
countries is negligible by world standards, the prospect of recovery
dims when 20 percent of the indebted countries’ exports are used to
service debt (see Table 3). The small size of the debt of individual
African countries relative to total world debt means that it poses no
threat to the global system and does not require the emergency pack-
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Table 3 External Debt and Debt-Related Statistics 
(billion of US$ and percentages)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Total debt (US$ billions) 301.7 312.2 329 340.6 349 
As a percentage of GDP 65.4 66.3 68 67.8 67.5
As a percentage of XGS 345.6 302.1 304.9 293.4 283.9
Debt service (US$ billions) 37.7 38.3 32.9 31 33
As a percentage of XGS 28.3 25.8 30.5 29.3 21.3
Source: ECA Economic Report, 1998.
Figure 1 Aid Dependency in Sub-Saharan Africa
Source: World Bank CD-ROM
ages that some Russian, Latin American, and Asian countries have
received. The Financial Times recently observed: “Its external debt is
too large for it to bear, but too small to concentrate the minds of policy-
makers whose priorities lie elsewhere.”23 Debates on what to do with
“debt overhang,” which has frustrated resumption of growth in Africa,
are conducted at a scandalously leisurely pace, at least when com-
pared with the sense of urgency that has produced rescue packages for
other parts of the world. Two years ago, the World Bank and the IMF
launched a plan for Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). But since
then, nothing much has happened largely because access to that plan
has been conditional upon meeting highly restrictive and overly rigid
criteria — conditions that are now being relaxed for Russia and the
countries of Asia.
Globalization and Democratization
One promise of the nationalist struggle was democratization. Indeed,
the nationalist put to use the liberal ideology that the imperialist swore
by to demand “one man, one vote.” However, no sooner had the
nationalists come to power than they declared democracy an alien ide-
ology and resorted to authoritarian rule, which has dominated much
of Africa. In most cases, the authoritarian turn was “justified” by the
imperatives of nation-building. Although the adhesion to those ideolo-
gies by a number of leaders may have been opportunistic, it obviously
reflected widespread perceptions of the problems plaguing the “mod-
ernizing” states in Africa. It was conventional wisdom that nation-
building in “traditional” or ethnically divided societies required a
strong central authority. Charismatic leaders and strong states would
be requisite to knead these diverse and putatively fissiparous identities
into one.
Development and developmentalism made the same demands on
the political dispensation. It was argued that accumulation of capital
needed a strong government to hold in check both the “revolution of
rising expectations” and the myopic vision of the masses, who sought
instant gratification and failed to see that rapid growth would require
putting off current consumption for higher levels of consumption later.
It was taken as a matter of faith that democracy would favor “macro-
economic populism,” which would lead to high levels of public con-
sumption and to fiscal crises. This trade-off between democracy and
development was part of conventional wisdom. A leading text of the
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time stated: “Political economy of development . . . poses a cruel choice
between rapid (self-sustained) expansion and democratic processes.”24
The argument persists today. Thus, Krause maintains that, for the pur-
pose of achieving a rapid industrial catch-up, a bureaucratic authori-
tarian regime is superior to other forms of authoritarianism and also
has performed better than democratic regimes.25 Other, more recent
formulations of the “authoritarian advantage” are founded on scepti-
cism about the economic rationality of democratic policy-making out-
comes. With respect to the ability of authoritarian regimes to pursue
adjustment policies, Stephen Haggard argues that
since authoritarian political arrangements give political elites autonomy
from distribution pressures, they increase the government’s ability to
extract resources, provide public goods, and impose the short term costs
associated with efficient economic adjustment. Weak legislatures that
limit the representative role of parties, the corporatist organization of
interest groups, and recourse to coercion in the face of resistance should
all expand government’s freedom to manoeuvre on economic policy.26
One should note that more recent empirical tests have cast doubts on
the “iron law” of the trade-off between democracy and development.27
By the 1990s, struggles for democracy intensified in Africa, and a
significant number of gains have been registered. Donors also began to
urge African countries to “get the politics right” if they were to receive
any aid. However, democracy in Africa still has to contend with a for-
midable set of economic constraints, the ponderous interference of
external institutions, and a dogmatic attenuation of choices producing
what I have labelled “choiceless democracies.”
One outstanding feature of this era when attempts at democratiza-
tion are taking place is, of course, globalization. There are different
views as to what globalization entails for democracy in the developing
countries. According to one view, the “opening up” of economies and
societies, the political conditionalities transmitted through global insti-
tutions, and the solidarity from movements encapsulated in the notion
of “global civil society” are generally supportive of efforts at democra-
tization in many countries. According to another view, however, the
demands of globalization, especially the erosion of national sover-
eignty and the uniformalization of what are considered fundamentals
of economic policy, limit the range of options for democratic regimes.
Those who hold the first view about the dominant effect of globaliza-
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tion consider democracy and economic liberalization as simply two
sides of the same coin: the edification of a liberal order, a natural con-
vergence of processes that mark the triumph of liberal capitalist order
and “the end of history” (in Fukuyama’s words), an end-state toward
which teleology has dutifully advanced us, despite the futile and fool-
ish resistance of so much of humanity. This “good-things-go-together”
approach is derived from the principle that liberal democracy and free
markets always go hand in hand since both processes entail the disper-
sion of power and the emergence of a bourgeoisie, both of which are
considered good for democracy. Similarly, those who stress the other
side of the globalization coin argue that, since liberal democracy is
premised on the sovereignty of nation-states and assumes that the
state controls its own fate (subject only to compromises it must make
and limits imposed upon it by actors), agencies and forces operating
within its territorial boundaries undermine a central tenet of liberal
democracy by eroding national sovereignty.
I have long argued that there is distinct danger that the “silent com-
pulsions of market forces,” the constriction of social imagination
through the peremptory foreclosure of options, and the economic con-
ditionalities imposed by international financial institutions produce
“choiceless democracies” with no powers over economic policy. Glob-
alization as manifested in Africa forces the state from its local moor-
ings, producing states that are not beholden to local interests and that
are autonomous, not with respect to the global but with respect to local
politics and interest articulation. States seeking to signal foreign capital
that they are in charge are tempted to assign maintenance functions to
institutions immune to liberal democratic political control. Central
banks are good examples of state institutions that pursue essentially
maintenance activities beyond the reach of democratic control. Politi-
cians have been quick to exploit these features and exigencies of glob-
alization; they shirk their responsibilities to the citizens by transferring
all the blame to outsiders. As Evans states:
The effect of global ideological consensus (sometimes aptly labelled the
“Washington consensus”) on individual states goes well beyond the
constraints imposed by any structural logic of the international econ-
omy. The fact that becoming more actively engaged in trying to improve
local economic conditions risks the opprobrium, not just of powerful pri-
vate actors, but also of the global hegemony makes any state interven-
tion a very risky proposition. An ideology that considers such action
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neither possible nor desirable does, however, release the local state from
responsibility for whatever economic woes its citizens may suffer at the
hands of the global economy.28
In the belief that foreigners are attracted by “strong” governments, a
number of leaders have not hesitated to engage in demonstrative vio-
lence, especially against urban populations, to attract foreign attention.
In some cases, leaders who are not fundamentally undemocratic are
identified as “new leaders” who will carry forward Africa’s “renais-
sance.”29 They are then armed to ensure “stability.” A consequence of
all this is that the state is more preoccupied with external appreciation
than domestic support.
This is serious in countries seeking to consolidate their newly
acquired democratic gains, a consolidation that requires enhancing the
credibility of democratic institutions and the legitimacy and respect of
elected bodies. Such bodies must be seen making meaningful decisions
that apply equally to all citizens within the jurisdiction of the nation-
state. Practices that suggest there are “authoritarian enclaves”
beholden to foreign interests and not accountable to local democratic
practices erode the trust in democratic institutions and persuade citi-
zens to reject them. States must not only promote capital accumula-
tion, but they also must do so in a political, legitimate, and sustainable
way. A state that emphasized only those policies that stimulated accu-
mulation regardless of equity considerations would find its growth
project faltering because political strife would undermine the stability
necessary for attracting foreign capital. Equally, a state that focuses
more on redistributive measures would eventually find itself with
nothing to distribute. If African countries once erred in the direction of
the latter, they are now being pushed in the opposite but equally futile
direction. Modern states must walk the tightrope of accumulation and
legitimization.
A surprising discovery for emerging democracies has been the
rather lukewarm reception accorded them by Western countries.
Geopolitical and economic concerns of the major powers have counted
more in the choice of African allies than adhesion to a putatively simi-
lar ideology. The favorite countries have been those with some strate-
gic importance or those that pursue “market-friendly” policies
regardless of their violation of human rights or pursuit of undeniably
authoritarian options. Even when donors have seemed to favor
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democracy, they seem to prefer a “tropicalized” version shorn of all
the key elements of true democracy.
Regional Cooperation
African nationalism always saw itself in both national and continental
terms. Indeed, for a while African nationalism and pan-Africanism
were coterminous. The expectation was that liberalization would
immediately be followed by some kind of regional arrangements that
ultimately would unify the continent. Although the reasons for
regional cooperation were couched in terms of economies of scale,
among other concerns, they also point to the need for regional collabo-
ration if Africa is to assert itself on the world scale. However, both the
nature of colonial rule and the eventual trajectories followed by
nationalist movements produced variants of petty nationalism; many
countries striving for independence increasingly disregarded the con-
tinental dimension. Ultimately, not much was achieved in terms of
regional cooperation. As a result, the continent with the most vocally
expressed ideology of regional collaboration (pan-Africanism) has
probably moved least in the direction of establishing viable regional
arrangements.
Many factors have worked against regional integration in Africa.
One is the small-mindedness of import substitution industrialization
in Africa, where Lilliputian markets were taken to be the basis of
viable industrialization. This, in turn, reflected the pettiness of the
many dictators that were to proliferate on the continent. Content with
their little fiefdoms, they lacked the vision and will to imagine larger
units to which they would have to surrender some of the power they
exercised over their hapless citizens. There was also, of course, the con-
tinued divide-and-rule tactic of the neocolonial powers. Africa’s spe-
cific form of participation in the globalization process has not
facilitated matters; one feature of it is the extent to which it has encour-
aged regionalism among contiguous states as a way of dealing with its
own challenges in some collective way.
In Africa, much of the debate on regional integration harks back to
the 1960s, when regional integration extended import substitution
industrialization among planned economies. Consequently, emphasis
was on complimentarity rather than on competition within the region.
Regional integration in the context of globalization usually enhances
the bargaining position of members in global negotiations and serves
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to prepare regional firms to compete equally in highly competitive
global markets. Such arrangements have invariably involved some
form of preferential treatment of member states. This, however, under-
mines the goals of structural adjustment programs, which tend to view
such preferential treatment as “distortions.” Indeed, in the context of
Africa, the adoption of SAPs by individual African countries has often
contradicted the terms of their adhesion to regional arrangements.30
V. Conclusion
I have sought here to examine globalization in light of the articulated
nationalist agenda in Africa. The current directions of globalization,
Africa’s own internal conditions, and the manner in which Africa is
being “adjusted” to the exigencies of globalization do not support the
historical mission of African nationalism. Globalization has tended to
exacerbate the internal paralysis of the reformist impulses of national-
ist objectives by rendering them unviable in relation to the judgment
and sanctions of international markets.
Globalization everywhere provokes particularistic responses. There
are at least two possible wrong ways of reacting to it—either by escap-
ing into xenophobic “fundamentalism,” or “nativist,” positions or by
engaging in blind celebration of the “universal” by an uncritical
embrace of globalization. Both reactions would constitute two ways of
being lost, as suggested in the epigraph, and both responses are, alas,
evident in Africa. Another approach is to acknowledge these processes
and rethink how to strategically engage with them in order to shield or
further one’s own agenda. It is my view that the reformist impulses of
the nationalist agenda, revamped to reflect the changed times, consti-
tute a useful point of departure in dealing with globalization. The fate
of Africa lies in a collective rethinking of that continent’s unfulfilled
humanistic tasks in light of what has transpired and the concrete situa-
tion today. Then we can recast those tasks as cornerstones of social jus-
tice, solidarity, and equality and, ultimately, reconnect the continent
with the rest of the world in a mutually beneficial way. We need to cre-
ate institutional designs that respond to the peculiarities of Africa’s
social pluralism. We may, in the process, have to rethink the attributes
of a nation-state in Africa — in terms of cultural basis and territorial
exclusivity — in order to give greater authority to regional arrange-
ments and strengthen regional self-policing. 
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Notes
1. The importance of conflicts and their management was, of course, a central feature of
the “theories of modernization.” It now enters as a new variable in “endogenous
growth” models. A systematic empirical analysis is found in the work of Dani Rodrik
(Rodrik 1997 and 1998) in which he runs a series of regressions to test the hypothesis that
the manner in which social conflicts interact with institutions of conflict management
plays a central role in determining the persistence of a country’s growth, its response to
volatility in the external environment, and the magnitude of the growth collapse follow-
ing a negative shock.
2. A similar classification of models of the relationship between globalization and the
state is proposed by Jayasuriya (1998): “hollowing out” enhanced strategies capacity and
transformative models of the state.
3. See, for instance, Bairoch 1485 (1996) and Hirst (1996).
4. See, for instance, Held (1991) and Rosenau 1384 (1998).
5. For an informed discussion of some of the implications of “governing without govern-
ments,” see Reinicke (1998).
6. Those with a more historical view will note that Africa’s current share in world trade
is in fact what it was at the beginning of the century. What has happened is that Asia has
regained its share, which it had lost during the tumultuous 1930s–1950s period.
7. The invisibility of Africa in international affairs is not only confined to the world of
journalism. In a survey of teaching courses in international relations in the United States,
Dunn (1498) observes that Africa was “incredibly underrepresented” in the curriculum
of some of the leading American universities.
8. It is, however, ironic that the putative demise of “dependencia” should occur precisely
as Africa entered the intensive care of neocolonial tutelage under which the continent
was to be most dependent on foreign institutions. The brighter prospects cast a revealing
light on dependence. Could this be suggestive of the fact that dependence could only be
a concern and independence imagined when Africa was most likely to break it? Interest-
ingly, the new sensitivity to dependence is spurred not by economic relations but by
political struggles. Democratization and the prospects of participation in policy-making
have sharply brought out the conflict between democratic demands and the exigencies
of policy dependence defined by a tantalizing number of conditionalities. Democrati-
cally elected governments have to contend with global forces that severely constrict the
choice set of policy-makers. Dependency now takes the form of “lack of ownership” of
policies ensured by a cascade of conditionalities.
9. The extent of this dependence is highlighted by the case of Uganda where the World
Bank is even assigned the task of soliciting funds from other donors for national projects,
prompting Himbara and Sultan to refer to Uganda as a “Bantustan state” (Himbara and
Sultan 1994). Polemics aside, the issues they point out are generally valid and have been
recognized in the growing concern over “ownership” of policies.
10. Holman, Financial Times (1998): 7.
11. For a wide-eyed, celebratory account of these leaders, see Connell 1322 (1998).
12. Kwame Anthony Appiah is convinced that:
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The National Bourgeoisie that took on the baton of nationalisation, industrialisa-
tion, bureaucratisation in the name of nationalism, turned out to be a kleptocracy.
Their enthusiasm for nativism was a rationalisation of their urge to keep the
national bourgeoisie of other nations — particularly the powerful industrial
nations—out of their way (1992).
13. D. Rodrik, “Globalization, Social Conflict and Economic Growth,” no. 1327 (1997): 5,
found in http://www.nber.org/ drodrik/papers.html
14. J. Aron, “The Institutional Foundations of Growth,” Ellis, S., ed., Africa Now: People,
Policies and Institutions (London: James Currey, 1996), 117.
15. This is similar to Cerney’s (1996) point that the new global economy is paralleled by a
shift from “welfare state” to “competition state.”
16. The recognition of this important role is articulated in the 1997 World Development
Report (World Bank 1997).
17. In 1996, the IMF also joined the “good governance” bandwagon. A “Guidance Note”
on good governance was adopted by the IMF executive board in 1997. The IMF’s view
was similar to that of Monsieur Jordain, who discovered he had been speaking in prose
all his life. The IMF claims it has:
. . . long provided advice and technical assistance that has helped to foster good
governance, such as promoting public sector transparency and accountability.
The IMF contributes to promoting good governance in member countries through
different channels. First, in its policy advice, the IMF has assisted its member
countries in creating systems that limit the scope for ad hoc decision making, for
rent seeking, and for undesirable preferential treatment of individuals or organi-
sations. To this end, the IMF has encouraged, among other things, liberalisation of
the exchange, trade, and price systems, and the elimination of direct credit alloca-
tion. Second, IMF technical assistance has helped member countries in enhancing
their capacity to design and implement economic policies, in building effective
policy-making institutions, and in improving public sector accountability. Third,
the IMF has promoted transparency in financial transactions in the government
budget, central bank, and the public sector more generally, and has provided
assistance to improve accounting, auditing, and statistical systems. In all these
ways, the IMF has helped countries to improve governance, to limit the opportu-
nity for corruption, and to increase the likelihood of exposing instances of poor
governance (IMF 1997b: 1).
Significantly, nowhere in the “Guidance Note” is the word democracy used.
18. Alassene Quattera 1486 (1997).
19. These institutions’ political economy was heavily influenced by the public-choice
school and especially by the view that the policy regimes they were now seeking to over-
throw were a result of rent seeking. Although democracy might empower the majority,
the logic of collective action suggested that it was the better organized minority that was
likely to “capture” state policies. Not surprisingly, support for democratization was
hedged by all kinds of caveats. It was often based on the hope that democracy might
make swallowing the bitter pill more tolerable, especially if a number of high profile
measures to mitigate the impact of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) were intro-
Thandika Mkandawire
103
duced. Perish the thought that democratically elected governments might have any
other policy option than SAPs.
20. The apparent seriousness of this problem has spawned a rapidly expanding litera-
ture on the effectiveness of conditionalities. (See, for example, Bird 1997b; Bird and Row-
lands 1997; Collier 1996; Killick 1996 and 1997).
21. Alassene Quattera 1486 (1997).
22. Mosley, “Globalization, Economic Policy and Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa 1970 –
95” (Reading: University of Reading, Department of Economics, 1996).
23. Financial Times (1998).
24. J. Bhagwati, The Economics of Underdeveloped Countries (London: Weidenfield
Nicholson, 1966).
25. This is far from being an isolated view. For discussions of similar views, see Errson
and Lane 1996; Findlay 1988; Leftwich 1996a and 1996b; Przevorski and Limongi 1995
and 1997; So/rensen 1993).
26. S. Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializ-
ing Countries (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), 262.
27. See, for instance, (Bardhan 1993; Errson and Lane 1996; Przevorski and Limongi 1995
and 1997).
28. P. Evans, “The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in the Era of Globaliza-
tion,” World Politics 50 (1997): 72.
29. For this perspective on the “new leaders,” see Connell 1322 (1998).
30. Some argue that the export orientation of SAPs will create a lobby for regional inte-
gration from among those firms engaged in exports (Aryeetey and Oduro 1996). This
need not happen. Orientation toward global markets can actually undercut interest in
regional markets among export-oriented firms.
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